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When he left the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Mr. Justice
Douglas suggested half seriously that every administrative agency should be dissolved
at the end of ten years. None of us would accept this suggestion without qualifica-
tion. Certainly I would disagree as to the SEC, with which I have been intimately
associated. Yet the grain of plausibility in the statement, however over-dramatized
it may be, is that occasional revitalization in every government agency is needed.
Continuous administration of acts involving any industry can lead to channelized
thinking, loss of excitement, and with it, loss of excited personnel. J. K. Galbraith1
has said that "Regulatory bodies, like the people who comprise them, have a marked
life cycle. In youth they are vigorous, aggressive, evangelistic, and even intolerant.
Later they mellow, and in old age-after a matter of ten or fifteen years-they be-
come, with some exceptions, either an arm of the industry they are regulating or
senile." I do not accept Galbraith's hyperbole any more than the opening statement.
Following the ebb, there may again be a flow. In many ways regulatory agencies
are no different from the federal departments of State, Treasury, Defense, or Justice.
All of them have benefited from resurveys and changes of pace. Secretary Mc-
Namara's imaginative reshaping of the Defense Department is an example on a
broad scale. I might say, however, that it would in my opinion be utterly impossible
to achieve any real resuscitation with an annual rotating chairman as in the case of
the Interstate Commerce Commission: someone has to be vested with responsibility.
Government regulatory agencies are stepchildren whose custody is contested
by both Congress and the executive, but without very much affection from either
one. Furthermore, as stepchildren they are often starvelings, receiving only the
crumbs in the federal budget. Despite these difficulties, the SEC has always had a
reputation for service and responsibility and a reserve of high quality staff members.
Like other institutions it has had its ups and downs, with meager budgets following
the war. (And the importance of an adequate budget is self-evident.) While the
Commission sought to maintain its standard of competency, it scarcely had time
to see the direction in which the industry that it regulated had been changing.
Without additional personnel and without fiscal support, the only choice was to meet
*Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission; Professor of Law, Columbia University (on leave).
This paper represents my personal views, not those of the Commission. Credit, if any, for the events
described must be shared with my valued colleagues-but responsibility for their interpretation is entirely
mine.
I JoHN K. GALaBArrH, TnE GREAT CRAsK 171 (1955).
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the day-to-day grist of tough financial problems on an ad hoc basis. At times in the
course of administrations whether Democratic or Republican, the only-indeed the
highest-goal expected of any agency seems to be that it conduct its day-to-day
work honestly and thoroughly without getting into any trouble. In a political
world even that may be high praise, but it offers to the agency only a dusty road for
its horizon.
For the SEC, as for most other institutions, an occasional re-examination is
needed. At the same time we have to recognize that taking the new road is riskier,
but also more fruitful. It should be easy to be both honest and conscientious, and
I do not underestimate the significance of progress through accretion-in the spirit
of the common law. But that is not enough. John W. Gardner recently said that
"a society that has learned the secret of continuous renewal will be a more interesting
and a more vital society. ..." The real fear that should haunt all administrative
agencies is that of inertia, the loss of initiative. How can this be surmounted?
II
In rethinking the problems of the SEC, one example was already available in
i96i-1962. A successful approach was already being taken in the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC). The television industry was awakened. Several
major FCC bills' were passed, and any legislative success in Congress was arduous
during the Kennedy Administration. Why not, therefore, like Newton Minow, start
off by comparing conditions in the securities industry with the vast wasteland of TV
programs?' The answer was several-fold. First of all, Mr. Minow was operating
with commissioners originally unsympathetic with change or at least the changes
he proposed. He had to speak out dramatically, courageously and alone, or not at
all. He could speak, not act. Secondly, the FCC has relatively limited powers in
the vital area of programming; the SEC, on the other hand, has rather broad
and general powers-which it had not adequately exercised. Thirdly, a broadside
against the TV industry would not have the same effect, psychological or otherwise,
as one addressed to an industry so closely tied with the stock market. Such an
attack upon the latter was not warranted;5 but even if it were, it might have been
disastrous in its market impact, and therefore irresponsible. Under these circum-
2 Gardner, Renewal in Societies and Men, in 1962 CARNEGiE Coap. ANN. REP. 3.
3 75 Stat. 420 (19f), 47 U.S.C. §§ 155, 405, 409 (Supp. IV, x963) (delegation and reorganization
amendments); 76 Stat. 64 (i962), 47 U.S.C. § 390-97 (Supp. IV, 1963) (matching grants for educa-
tion'al TV); 76 Stat. 15O (x962), 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 330 (Supp. IV, x963) (authority to require all.
channel receivers); 76 Stat. 49 (x962), 47 U.S.C. § 701-44 (Supp. IV, 1963) (Communications
Satellite Act).
'N.Y. Times, May io, 1961, p. i, col. 2.
'The letter of transmittal to Congress which accompanied the Commission's Report of Special Study
of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission made clear that, while serious short-
comings were apparent, the fundamental structure of the securities markets and the regulatory pattern
of the securities acts did not require drastic reconstruction. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report
of Special Study of Securies Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., ist Sess., pt. x, at ii! (1963)
[hereinafter referred to as Special Study].
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stances, it was necessary to take a totally different tack toward raising standards and
shifting direction in the securities industry. Lawyers prefer if possible to take posi-
tions on the basis of thorough, fair, and responsible study. It is slower, but any major
and abiding shift in thinking within the government is a laborious process at best.
A. The first step in the case of the SEC was to bring in some consultants who
were both knowledgeable and could afford to take some time off to make recom-
mendations. They were two lawyers (one a professor) and a businessman. The
businessman was to insure that there was no waste of manpower observable, and
the lawyers were there to inquire where we were going in the administration of the
laws under our supervision.
One question was whether any SEC functions should be scrapped. This is a novel
inquiry among government institutions, flying in the very face of Parkinson's Law.6
In this connection an analysis was made of an area of regulation which had once-
from 1938 to x945-been our largest and most successful achievement-the Public
Utility Holding Company Act 7 Now that it had fulfilled its basic purposes-the
rationalization of an industry-should it be dropped entirely as functus officio? Or if
the Public Utility Holding Company Act should not be jettisoned entirely, should its
administration be shifted to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), which is charged
generally with the regulation of the gas and electric industries? This, we found,
was not a matter of logic alone. It was a political question. Many people who
before have inveighed against the SEC in its administration of the act prefer a
known to an unknown agency, the FPC. The latter could undoubtedly strengthen
its hold over the gas and electric utilities if SEC financing powers were coupled
with its existing jurisdiction over routes and rates. Opposition to any change began
to develop. The question, therefore, was left whether we ought to tamper with
the Utility Act. Is it worth one's while to devote his energies to ridding an agency
of its vestigial duties? It is almost as hard to wipe a statute off the books as it is
to enact one, and much less rewarding. More important constructive legislation was
needed, and Congress has only limited time for agencies such as the SEC. Therefore,
since the Public Utility Holding Company Act inhibits the rebirth of certain abuses,
it seemed of value to retain on the books under our aegis-but with a limited
amount of regulatory activity. By its very existence, it is a policeman even without
aggressive enforcement.
B. The overwhelmingly predominant phase of our re-examination was the
Special Study of the Securities Markets authorized by Congress in 1961 and com-
pleted on August 8, 1963. To appreciate the motivation of the congressional resolu-
tion authorizing the Study, the condition of the securities markets during 1961 must
be appreciatedV This was a turbulent market in which a record number of com-
panies, many of them highly speculative, were going to the public for financing.
'CYmIL N. PARKINSON, PARKINSON'S LAw (1957).
'Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79a-79z(6) (958).
' See Cary, The Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 62
MicH. L. REV. 557, 558 (1964).
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The "hot issue" was prevalent; initial trading markets for many new issues reflected
an extravagant premium over the offering price. Price-earnings ratios were at
extraordinary levels. Trading volume was soaring, accompanied by noticeably high
"fails" to receive or deliver stock certificates. The Commission's enforcement ma-
chinery was overloaded. Criminal references to the Department of Justice and ad-
ministrative proceedings against brokers were at all time highs. The most dramatic
breakdown in controls was reflected in the SEC investigation of the American Stock
Exchange,9 prompted by the Commission's expulsion of the leading specialist firm
of Re, Re & Sagarese.' °
The Commission, the self-regulatory agencies, and the industry were over-
whelmed with daily administrative problems and were forced to meet issues on
an ad hoc basis. Thus, it seemed a highly propitious time for a thorough survey
of the state of the securities markets and the adequacy of investor protection.
Without money and personnel, such an ambitious program would not be possible.
Here in retrospect we were beneficiaries of the wisdom of Congress and an element
of luck. The question might have been posed whether the Study should be made
by the Congress or by the SEC. Congressional investigations of regulatory agencies
are, on balance, undoubtedly salutary. Indeed, they may well be the factor most
responsible for keeping agencies from falling asleep, or suffering the fate envisioned
by Galbraith. It may also be highly appropriate for Congress to investigate matters
which raise novel or broad policy issues or where no other agency with the requisite
expertise is available. The Senate hearings which laid the foundations for the
Securities Act of 1933" and the Securities Exchange Act of 193412 were undoubtedly
of this type.'3 But the question always arises whether a study could be done differ-
ently or better. A congressional investigation might have had the tendency of
focusing on the SEC rather than upon major developments in the market. Not
infrequently general policy inquiries are clouded and confused by examination into
particular cases, often stemming from private complaints. The Commission might
then have spent most of its time attempting to defend what it had or had not done
within the limitations of a straitened budget. Thus the real object might well have
been missed, for we, like the securities industry itself, had been so engrossed that
' SEC STAFF REPORT on ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND REGuLATIoN OF CONDUCT O MEMERS
OF THE AmERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (1962).
"°Re, Re & Sagarese, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6551, May 4, 596i; SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 69oo, Sept. 21, 1962.
21 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a to aa (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 77 b-h
(Supp. IV, z963).
12 48 Stat. 881 (934), as amended, z5 US.C. H 78a to hh-i (x958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
99 78c(a)-s (Supp. IV, 1963).
"
1 According to HILLEL BLACK, THE WATCHDOGS OF WALL STREET 10 (1962), the Senate Hearings
originated in a Republican desire to thwart a Democratic scheme. In 1932 Frederick C. Walcott, Republi-
can Senator from Connecticut, believed that Democratic Wall Street traders might launch a bear raid to
depress the market and discredit the Hoover Administration. Public hearings intended to expose this
planf failed of their immediate object, but they did uncover enough evidence of pools, commercial bribery,
and manipulation to stimulate further hearings in 1933 and 1934.
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there was neither time nor personnel nor opportunity to back away and ask where
the industry was moving and whether present regulations met the changes wrought
over thirty years.
On August 24, 1961, Congressman Peter Mack introduced a resolution (now
section i9(d) of the Securities Exchange Act) authorizing and directing the Com-
mission "to make a study and investigation of the adequacy for the protection of the
investors, of the rules of the . . . exchanges and the national securities associa-
tions.... ,,." The Mack resolution provided a vehicle for re-examination by the
Commission. Naturally, therefore, we seized upon it as the opportunity for which
we were seeking. We said before the House Subcommittee: s
Our present budget ... and our manpower, will not support a thorough study of the
exchanges and over-the-counter markets at this time.... [T]he constant danger in our
Commission is that with market activities and flotations at an all time high, we become so
overwhelmed with immediate problems . . . that we are virtually forced to concentrate
all our funds and manpower upon them and cannot do any long-range planning.
As already noted, the Study of some 3,000 pages was submitted to Congress in
the late summer of 1963. Its breadth may perhaps be appreciated by a notation of the
range of its subject matter: qualification standards for those in the securities in-
dustry;"0 selling and investment advisory practices;' 7 distributions of securities, in-
cluding problems of "hot issues";' s intrastate and real estate offerings;' 9 the operation
of the various securities markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange,20 the
regional exchanges, 2 ' the "third market"22 (i.e., the trading of listed securities off
the exchanges), and the over-the-counter market, 2 and the interrelationship of these
markets; the obligations of issuers of both listed and unlisted publicly held securi-
ties; 24 the gaps and inconsistencies in securities credit -regulation;25 selected aspects
of mutual funds;2' and the operation of self-regulation.ar
Substantial progress has since been made. The Study has given rise to a bill2"
now already through the Senate and before the House, and 'to a number of rfile-
making proceedings to exercise power which the Commission already has. Fur-
"H.R.J. Res. 438, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (t961), which became law, 75 Stat. 465 (x961), as x9(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 88x (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a to hh-r (1958), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(s) (d) (Supp. IV, 1963).
" Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 438 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 3, at 8 (rg6x).
1 8Spedal Study, pt. I, ch. II.
I d., pt i, ch. 111.
Id., pt I, ch. IV.B.3.
i Id., pt. x, ch. IV.D.-E.
"I d., pt. 2, ch. VI.
5 1 Id., pt. 2, ch. VILE.
2 Id., pt. 2, ch. VIID.
"I d., pt 2, ch. VII.
" Id., Pt. 3, ch. IX.5 d., Pt. 4, ch. X.
"I Id., Pt, 4, ch. XI.
"' Id., pt. 4, ch. XII.
28 S. x642, H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
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thermore, the industry has already made substantial progress in improving itself.
As soon as the Commission began asking questions, the industry became aware of
evident deficiencies. Indeed it might be said to have made its own special study.
Our criticism has not been met with enthusiasm, but a constructive attitude rather
than total antagonism has been preserved-thanks in part to a sustained effort made
to maintain thoroughness, fairness, and responsibility. As the London Economist
said of the Study: "Americans who have long admired the quality of investigations
conducted by the British Royal Commission may take heart. It can happen here. '20
Perhaps another reason why a study of this type can have an impact upon both
the Commission and the industry it regulates is that there was a conscious decision
to give the study group considerable independence. It would have been impossible
to secure complete agreement of all five commissioners on a 3,000 page analysis
within the limited time period which we were allowed. It is obvious, moreover, that
objective views can provide a new and welcome stimulus to us on the inside. Sensi-
tive to congressional criticism, we all tend to justify every action rather than admit
human (and-even more-institutional) fallibility.
Furthermore, the Commission would be required to act subsequently on the
recommendations of the Report of the Special Study under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act; and if a firm and hardened position were taken by the Commission
rather than by an independent group, it would be difficult if not impossible for us
to deal with the industry. Finally, it was anticipated that while the report would
focus on the shortcomings in the industry and in the self-regulatory agencies, in
certain respects there would be express or implied criticism of the Commission
itself. Institutions-government, quasi-government or private-all benefit from
examination. 0 A spirit of independence provides the additional advantage of staff
enthusiasm and esprit de corps, coupled with a fresh point of view.
Such a pattern might well be applicable to other administrative agencies. On
the one hand, it is desirable to introduce outsiders. In our case, the Special Study
was staffed by many lawyers from private practice, economists, and university pro-
fessors. On the other hand, it must not be wholly divorced from those who will
have the responsibility of running the agency. There were a number from the Com-
mission's regular staff to provide some continuity between the two stages, making
recommendations and putting them into effect.
C. Another phase of the re-examination concentrated on the Investment Company
Act of i94o.Y It had its genesis more than six years ago, in i958. The industry
has gone through dynamic changes, and there is some question whether the act
has the plasticity to meet them. Until recently the Commission's administration of
20 208 LONDON ECONOMIST 587 (1963)-
SoI would emphasize, however, the Commission did not divorce itself from the Special Study but
strongly endorsed its soundness and expressed the conviction that it was a thoroughly responsible docu-
ment. SpeCid Study, pt. 1, at iv-v.
U154 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 8oa-i to -52 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 8oa-2(a)(37) to -39(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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the Investment Company Act was largely focused on disclosure requirements,
occasional enforcement of regulatory provisions, and many intellectually difficult
problems involving exemptions.
Only in the late fifties did the Commission fully appreciate that this was no
longer a modest industry whose relative insignificance in comparison with other
investment media had tended to obscure basic questions warranting thorough
examination. Lately the industry had become a major alternative among investors'
choices. Investment companies have grown from 2.5 billion dollars in i94o to
over 23 billion in i96o and 36 billion in 1963? z Shareholder accounts of mutual
funds were 296 thousand in 1940, 4.9 million in i96o, and over 6 million in 1963 3
Furthermore, administration of the act could no longer be confined to the traditional
investment company alone. Other financial institutions developed means to take
advantage of the mutual fund concept which was attracting public funds-first the
insurance companies with variable annuities, and now the banks with variations
of their traditional common trust funds. In consequence, a new approach was sought
upon which to base regulation of both the variable annuities of insurance com-
panies and the commingled accounts of banks, without impinging on the traditional
jurisdiction of insurance or banking regulatory authorities. Our position was that
these institutions are moving squarely into the mutual fund business, and hence that
all investors in mutual funds should receive the same protections-regardless of
whether the fund is sponsored by a bank,-4 an insurance companya5 a broker, an
investment counsellor, or any other person.
Again, as a fresh approach both to the understanding by investment companies
of the basic requirements of the i94o Act and to its more effective enforcement, we
have developed a new comprehensive annual report form to be certified by the
fund's independent certified public accountant3 ' This represents a move toward
self-inspection which is consistent with a philosophy that part of the regulatory
responsibility should be placed upon the industry. There is no reason why govern-
ment should expand when others can be induced to fill the vacuum.8
In an attempt to resolve the structural problems inherent in the investment
company industry, we were fortunate in having already underway, since 1958, a study
of mutual funds prepared for the Commission by the Wharton School of Finance
32 SEC, CLAss icATioN, ASSETS AND TAXATIOm OF REGISTERED INVESTMENT COMPANIES UNDER THE 1940
AcT AS OF JUNE 30, 1963.
SARTIR WIESENBERGER, INVESTMENT COMPANIES 28 (1963).
-Letter to Senator A. Willis Robertson, ZIo CONG. Rac. 79z-92 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1964); Hearing
on Common Trust Funds Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (z963).
"
5Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. CO., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); The
Prudential Insurance Company of America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 3620, Jan. 22, z963, aff'd,
Prudential Ins. CO. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3 d Cir. 1964).
"' Address by William L. Cary, "The Securities and Exchange Commission After the Special Study
of Securities Markets," Investment Bankers Association of America, Dec. 2, 1963. An "Exposure Draft"
of a proposed revision of Annual Report Form N-3oA-z for Management Investment Companies was
circulated to members of the industry in March, x964.
'7 Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244 (x963).
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and Commerce s This has been supplemented, particularly as to the selling area,
by work of the Special Study,"' and, as to the industry structure, by extensive
case studies by a group brought especially to the Commission and operating within
our permanent staff. We have examined the highly competitive drive to sell
mutual funds and the devices used for that purpose-such as contractual or front-
end load plansY° In many instances these plans involve a commission of fifty per
cent of the first year's payment, which may be lost if the contract lapses. Without
our taking direct action against the front-end load (which would probably require
statutory amendment), the very study of the field has resulted in a trend to volun-
tary reduction of its impact by lessening and stretching out the load.'
Through our studies, also, we have come to identify the consequences of conflicts
of interest fostered by the nature of the industry structure, and tolerated within the
act.' In analyzing investment companies we have found a number of potential or
actual problems which are inherent in the present pattern of the industry. Many
of'them stem from a unique historical development, for the management of invest-
ment funds has been primarily by contract with outsiders rather than by employees
of the company itself. In part as a result of our activities and in part because of
some sixty odd lawsuits brought by complaining shareholders, there is some evidence
that the fund directors are now increasingly aware of their responsibility and
are assuming more active and vigorous roles. However, in arriving at any totally
satisfactory solutioh, progress" has been retarded by traditional patterns in the
industry.
D. Another area for restudy 'still presents itself to the Commission during the
wcming year. It is the field of disclosure, involving the registration statements and
p r'oxy statements, in which the Commission has done a thorough job and developed
i commendable tradition. The Report indicated that "the Commission's administra-
tion of the registration provisions of the Securities Act has been one of its most
outstanding achievements and the statute itself has proved generally adequate
and workable."'  At the same time it pointed out limited areas in which improve-
ments could be made. For example, much more can be done in informing the bar
and the public of our policies and practices in the disclosure area, and in removing
the mystique surrounding the registration process. Furthermore, on a longer-term
basis, efforts should be made to achieve a greater integration as to information
required under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4
38 A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
Special Study, Pt. 4, ch. XI.
Id. at, 172.
"Registration Statement No. 2-15015, Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., post effective amendment filed
with SEC April 7, 1964.
' Spedal Study, pt. 1, at 557-
* "A critical analysis of the Special Study proposal to secure greater integration as to information
required under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 appears in Heller,
"Integration" of the Dissemination of Information Under the Securities Act of z933 and the Securitier
Exchange Act of z934, this symposium, 29 LAw & CoNTrsssP. PRos. 749 (x964).
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Certainly prospectuses could also be improved, as could the proxy rules. A
beginning to remove the barnacles found to have developed over thirty years of
administration is already being made, but it will of necessity take time. This is a
more technical area for selected improvement, but a rewarding one with which the
bar and the industry should be in total sympathy.
III
Hand in hand with the effort of re-examination was the effort of getting and
keeping good people. It is impossible to make headway without the efforts of a
devoted staff combined with independent views from the outside. This problem-
personnel-is an ever present one in government, particularly -when the agency is
not attempting to move ahead but simply to carry on its day-to-day responsibilities.
As already indicated, the Commission has had a reserve of excellent, able, and dedi-
cated public servants. Yet when I came to the SEC, I was told by people on the
staff not to try to get any new top-ranking law graduates and young lawyers, first
because we could not attract them, and secondly because they would leave. These
are premises with which I totally disagree. We strove to demonstrate the error of
the first point-to bring again to the Commission the reputation it enjoyed in the
i93os, when almost every young lawyer in the government wanted to be associa-
ated with the SEC or the Solicitor General's office-as the two best law offices
in Washington. In this effort we have had some success. We also found by
statistical analysis that superior lawyers generally leave the SEC no sooner and no
later than average ones. Much depends on whether their efforts are recognized and
their talents fully challenged. Happily, our long tradition of intellectual insubordina-
tion (encouraging every one to speak his mind) has continued to flourish, and this
in turn has kindled excitement in the work. It is often wanting in government
institutions.
It must be recognized that the personnel problem is in part a function of the
budget, as reflected in salaries, promotions, and the opportunity to bring in new
and able young people--particularly lawyers. Here again, the effort to introduce
new thinking may in turn generate encouragement from the Bureau of the Budget
and from Congress. To some extent there is a circular effect: a larger budget
enables an agency to look ahead of its day-to-day responsibilities, while if it looks
ahead, Congress and the executive may find a basis for making more funds available.
In this respect the Commission has had good fortune with an increase in budget over
four years from $9.5 million for i96i to $14.6 million (estimate) for 1965, and in
personnel from i,o95 to 1,480 (estimate)?4 The move to expand-within limits-is,
I trust, to be differentiated from "empire building": a common hallmark of business
as well as government administration. We have not been interested in growth as
such. Indeed we have firmly declined suggestions by members of Congress that we
"' House Comm. on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, r965, H.R. Rm. No. x4X3,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. r6 (1964).
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undertake new tasks not directly related to securities regulation, and we should be
prepared to contract if our work should ever decline.
After all of these efforts in the direction of re-examination and change, some
have asked whether it was not time for us to consolidate and look for no more
avenues for innovation. This may well be true in part. After all, Mr. Gardner's
thesis of "continuous renewal" assumes the careful execution as well as the creation
of ideas. There remains much to be done to carry out the recommendations which
have already been made. This is our present task, and it is a large one. With such
a program ahead, we must remain aware that progress in government is exasperating
and laborious, but it need not be impossible. This is not the time for honest, con-
scientious administration alone-without momentum.
